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Abstract 
This article provides insights into the long-term trends of intergenerational mobility of men and 
women born in the United States. We study both absolute and relative social mobility and analyze in 
some detail the relation between education and intergenerational mobility. We document massive 
changes in the occupational structure and the educational system of the US. Especially women 
benefitted consistently from the trend towards a post-industrial society, experiencing decreasing levels 
of downward mobility, while tendencies towards polarization of the occupational structure increased 
downward mobility for men. We find little evidence that education is becoming increasingly a motor 
for absolute upward mobility but our findings suggest that class placement is becoming more 
heterogeneous across educational levels. Our assessment of changes in relative mobility levels and 
how they relate to changes in education reveals quite different stories for men and women. While class 
fluidity increased among men, it remained stable among women. We find that the moderate increases 
in class fluidity among men are primarily driven by educational expansion and the compositional 
effect. For women, on the contrary, educational expansion alone had the potential to decrease female 
fluidity – chiefly since it elevated women’s qualifications and enabled them henceforth to gain access 
to occupations restricted to their fathers. 
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Introduction 
This article provides insights into the long-term trends of intergenerational mobility of men and 
women born in the United States. We study both absolute and relative social mobility and analyze in 
some detail the relation between education and intergenerational mobility. By doing so, we provide 
some insights into possible drivers of relative mobility trends in the United States. Given the pervasive 
narrative of the U.S. as the land of opportunity (Grusky et al., 2015), it is astounding that the U.S. has 
not been part of the latest dedicated comparative research efforts on social class mobility (e.g. Breen, 
2004a) – a gap that we hope to narrow with this contribution. The fundamental transformation of the 
U.S. education system, which raised American’s average educational attainment above most other 
countries over much of the 20th century, makes an interesting case for the study of the association of 
class mobility and education (Goldin and Katz 2008, Garfinkel et al. 2010). 
While findings on social mobility trends in the U.S. remain subject to controversial debate 
(Hout & Guest, 2013; Xie & Killewald, 2013; Mitnik et al., 2016), we also lack a full understanding of 
the determinants of these trends. Recently, there has been some progress towards a causal explanation 
of the influence of educational expansion on occupational attainment around the turn of the 19th into 
the 20th century (Rauscher, 2015); we seek to expand prior descriptive evidence on the role of 
education in shaping long-term mobility trends throughout the 20th and early 21st century (Pfeffer and 
Hertel 2015). While we confirm and expand the findings of prior studies for men (Hout, 1988; Torche, 
2011; Pfeffer & Hertel, 2015), we also add new material for women who have often been ignored in 
most research on social class mobility. 
The article is structured as follows: Section 1 provides a brief summary of the changing 
economic and social context within which mobility takes place. We then present a broad overview of 
U.S. social mobility studies in Section 2 and discuss the relationship between mobility and education 
as well as possible gender differences in mobility. In Section 3, we present the new database that we 
assembled for the study of long-term trends in social mobility and provide information on the 
conceptualization and measurement of our main variables. In Section 4, we provide an assessment of 
cohort changes in absolute mobility, studying two-way and three-way associations between origins, 
education and destinations in some detail. In Section 5, we provide a range of analyses on relative 
mobility and its relationship to education, with a focus on assessing the overall role of education and 
educational expansion in explaining cohort trends. The article concludes with a discussion of the main 
findings in Section 6.  
 
1. Historical Context 
In less than a century, or over the course of four generations, the United States shifted from a heavily 
agrarian and rural society to an industrial and, finally, post-industrial society (Fischer & Hout, 2006). 
This transformation was fundamental enough that, in terms of its economic context, the U.S. may have 
more in common with other Western capitalist societies today than with its own a hundred years ago 
(Long & Ferrie, 2013). Below, we highlight historical changes in three areas that had perhaps the most 
profound societal impact: the occupational structure, the employment of women, and educational 
participation. 
 
Economic change and the occupational structure 
The shift in the demand for labor from the agricultural to the industrial and service sectors was 
profound. Between the early 1920s and the late 2000s, the share of individuals employed in agriculture 
or other extractive industries declined in the United States from 29 to two percent (data in this 
paragraph come from Singelmann, 1978; Castells, 1996 [2010]; ILO, 2014). Until the mid-1970s, 
Fordist mass production and mass consumption resulted in a boom in employment in manufacturing, 
utilities and construction industries. In 1970, around 33 percent of Americans worked in the 
transformative industries and, most frequently, in manufacturing. While technological advances over 
the following decades replaced manual labor, a demand shift, partly fueled by rising levels of 
economic well-being at the top, also drove employment growth in the service industries (Kollmeyer, 
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2009). Especially producer and business services (mostly banking, insurance, real estate, engineering, 
and accounting) and social services (mostly educational, health, and welfare services) grew 
substantially over the course of the 20th century. Employment in the former increased from three to 18 
percent and employment in the latter surged from nine to 28 percent between 1920 and 2008. Over the 
same time, employment shares in the transformative industries declined to about 19 percent.  
These sectoral shifts in the labor market amounted to a radical transformation of the 
occupational structure. The technologically driven demand for highly educated labor, especially for 
technicians, semi-professionals, and professionals in the growing social and business services sectors 
resulted in an upgrading of large parts of the occupational structure (Goldin & Katz, 2008; Oesch, 
2013). At the same time, mechanization, automation, and routinization rendered routine manual and 
non-manual occupations unnecessarily costly to sustain (Autor et al., 2003), while low-wage non-
routine service positions flourished under the American market-oriented welfare regime (Esping-
Andersen, 1999; Esping-Andersen, 2000; Wren, 2013). In effect, the occupational structure gradually 
upgraded but also polarized in more recent decades as “bad jobs” also continued to grow (Kalleberg et 
al., 2000; Wright & Dwyer, 2003; Kalleberg, 2009). 
 
Rising female employment 
Another fundamental transition in the labor market over the 20th century was the increasing 
participation of female labor, which was fueled by the rise of white-collar work and, in particular, 
services, by increasing education and real wages, decreasing working hours, and decreasing fertility 
(Goldin, 1990; Buchmann & DiPrete, 2006; Diprete & Buchmann, 2006; Kearney, 2006). The rate of 
participation of women in the labor force increased from 19 percent in 1890 to 59 percent in the late 
1990s, with little change since (Goldin, 1990, p. 17; England, 2011; Toossi, 2015, p. 10). In the 
Fordist heydays of the 1950s to the 1970s, working-class women frequently worked the assembly lines 
in food processing, e.g., in canneries (Ruiz, 1987), whereas middle class women worked in lower 
clerical occupations, forming the administrative backbone of the Fordist era (England & Boyer, 2009). 
The rise in social service occupations especially – particularly in education, the health industry, and 
personal services – sustained women’s, and mostly mothers’, integration into the labor market, though 
many of these new jobs were associated with traditional female roles and yielded low pay (Esping-
Andersen, 1999; England, 2010). As women moved increasingly into formerly male-dominated, 
middle-class positions, sex segregation in those occupations declined remarkably, from the 1950s, but 
remained virtually unchanged in working-class occupations where gender barriers continue to exist 
between blue collar and “pink collar” occupations (Bergmann, 2011; England, 2011). 
 
Educational Expansion 
Another fundamental transformation in the 20th century was rapidly increasing educational 
participation. However, as Goldin and Katz (2008) argue, the roots of this tremendous expansion reach 
back well before the 20th century: a high degree of local autonomy, the public funding and provision of 
education, the absence of church control, and early-tracking or gender selection are parts of a 
comparatively egalitarian U.S. tradition that facilitated mass education. Educational expansion over 
the 19th and 20th century entailed the creation of new schools, especially in rural areas, the creation of 
universities, and the abolition or reduction of school and university fees. At times, direct policy 
interventions further fostered educational expansion, in particular the GI bill, which provided 
educational opportunities to returning (white) veterans of WWII and the Korea war and led to a surge 
in men’s college enrollment in the post-war era (Bound & Turner, 2002; Katznelson, 2005). From the 
1960s onwards, racial desegregation of the educational system at the secondary level, by means of 
busing, and the post-secondary level, by means of affirmative action policies (e.g., in the form of 
quotas for discriminated groups) and financial aid to students from low-income families (e.g. Pell 
grants), sustained further educational attainment (Roksa et al., 2007). 
As a result, secondary and tertiary school enrollment and graduation rates rose substantially 
over the 20th century. High school graduation among Americans aged 25 years and older surged 
between 1910 and 2014 from 14 to 88 percent; the share of university graduates increased from 3 to 32 
percent (U.S. Department of Education, 2015). Finally, women began to outperform men in college 
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graduation rates in the early 1980s, partly because men who grew up with less-educated or absent 
fathers fare particularly poorly (Jacobs, 1996; Buchmann & DiPrete, 2006). However, there is little 
indication that class differences in educational attainment declined markedly over recent decades 
(Roksa et al., 2007). Moreover, racial differences in educational attainment, though somewhat muted, 
very much survived the end of legal segregation in 1964 (Jencks & Phillips, 1998; McDaniel et al., 
2011). 
 
2. Prior Work on Trends in Mobility 
 
Descriptions of Trends in Mobility  
The historical trends in the economic and occupational structure just described had immediate 
implications for absolute intergenerational mobility patterns. Most obviously, the change from an 
agrarian society to an industrial society channeled many individuals from an agricultural family 
background into manual industrial and non-manual positions at the beginning of the 20th century. In 
the second half of the 20th century, the surging service sector pulled many individuals from lower 
manual and non-manual backgrounds into the ranks of a swelling middle class (Hauser et al., 1975; 
Hertel, 2015). This structural change also accounted for increased upward and decreased downward 
mobility among women during the second half of the century (Beller & Hout, 2006). 
Soon after the first set of empirical studies on social mobility (e.g. Lipset & Zetterberg 1959), 
the field began to focus on the question of how relative mobility chances could be studied separately 
from these large structural shifts; it was the introduction of log-linear models that allowed for the 
analysis of relative mobility chances, i.e. social fluidity (Goodman, 1969, 1979, 1984). The following 
research on relative class mobility established a slow increase in social mobility between the 1960s 
and 1980s (Featherman and Hauser 1978, Grusky 1986, Hout 1984, Hout 1988, DiPrete and Grusky 
1990). Though these analyses revealed moderate increases in social fluidity, cross-national 
comparative analyses still lent little empirical credibility to the notion of an exceptionally high level of 
intergenerational mobility in the U.S., i.e. the leitmotiv of the American Dream, i.e. (Erikson & 
Goldthorpe, 1985, 1992). 
Research on more recent trends since the mid-1980s provides some evidence that social 
fluidity ceased to increase or, in select areas of the class structure, even declined. Beller (2009) found 
a significant decline in social class fluidity for men, but not for women, born between 1965 and 1979, 
once information on mothers’ class was included in the construction of social origins (though only in a 
very particular way). Studying change in social fluidity of 25 to 40 year old Americans between the 
1970s and the 2000s, Mitnik and colleagues (2016) also find that the strength of the intergenerational 
class association recently decreased after an initial increase of mobility chances.1 The authors propose 
that this convex trend is driven by two main forces: the initial increase in social fluidity may have 
resulted from educational expansion, whereas they can show that the later decline stems from growing 
immobility in the professional-managerial classes, a finding they attribute to the surge of top-incomes 
that facilitated closure strategies among the upper classes. 
Based on historical census data, Long and Ferrie (2013) draw different conclusions about 
long-term trends in relative social mobility: they find that relative mobility had in fact been 
exceptionally high in the late 19th century but has decreased steadily since. These findings, however, 
have been rejected upon reanalysis by Xie and Killewald (2013), as well as Hout and Guest (2013). 
Xie and Killewald uncover three factors that account for bias in Long and Ferrie’s analyses: a selective 
sample arising from class differences in co-residence patterns between sons and fathers; the statistical 
modeling strategy that takes the independence of origins and destinations as reference2; and the high 
                                                     
1 This result is stable across two different conceptualizations of social origins. Mitnik et al. measure social origins based only 
on father’s class (as we do in the following) as well as based on the combination of mother and father’s class as 
suggested by Beller (2009). 
2 Xie and Killewald note that Long and Ferrie’s finding may be “simply an artifact of their statistical method” (Xie & 
Killewald, 2013, p. 2017) based on the fact that the reference model used (“independence”) assumes homogeneous 
proportions in social origins across classes (Powers & Xie, 2008, p. 72). The combination of a sharp decline in farming 
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immobility among farmers, a point of critique further supported by Hout and Guest’s separate 
reanalysis. 
In contrast to Long and Ferrie, we have confirmed in our own prior work (Pfeffer & Hertel, 
2015) the earlier stated broad trends in relative class mobility, i.e. moderate but steady declines in 
social fluidity during the second half of the 20th century and the first signs of a stalling or even reversal 
of this trend for the most recent cohorts. In that work, however, we also cautioned against taking these 
findings as a foundation for sweeping statements about changes in the openness of U.S. society. Not 
only do trends in inequality in class attainment based on other measures of family background differ 
(as they do for parental education; ibid: pp.160ff), but we were also unable, much like most prior 
research, to marshal evidence for women (but see ibid, Appendix B). The additional data presented 
here allows us to do just that. 
 
Relating Mobility Trends to Changes in Education 
While long-term trends in social mobility continue to be subject to debate, little disagreement exists 
about the pivotal role of education for the intergenerational association between social origins and 
destinations (Bernardi & Ballarino, 2016). Trends in educational attainment may be related to trends in 
social class mobility through multiple avenues: changes in educational inequality (association between 
origins [O] and education [E], OE), changes in class returns to education (association between 
education [E] and destination [D], ED), changes in the mediating role of education for 
intergenerational class associations (OD association conditional on E), and the “compositional effect” 
(OD association as it varies over E; also discussed below). 
Regarding trends in educational inequality (OE), prior research has consistently shown that 
the massive educational expansion of the 20th century had little effect on class differentials in 
educational attainment (Mare, 1981; Hout et al., 1993; Mare, 1993; Hout & Dohan, 1996). While there 
has been some decline in gender and racial differences in access to higher education, class inequality 
in education has proven remarkably stable in the United States (Roksa et al., 2007). Thus, despite early 
saturation of secondary education among upper classes, inequality at that level has remained largely 
stable and so has class inequality at the tertiary level. 
Long-term trends in the association between education and class destinations (ED) are less 
well established. Our own prior work found no consistent trend for men in social class returns to 
education (Pfeffer & Hertel 2015). Most other prior research focused on educational returns using 
different measures of economic destinations: based on measures of occupational status, returns to 
education appear to be quite stable (Grusky & DiPrete, 1990; Hauser et al., 2000; Torche, 2016), while 
income returns have been rising rapidly (Autor et al., 2008; Goldin & Katz, 2008). The findings are 
not necessarily in conflict, since we also know that the income variance within classes has also 
changed over time (Weeden & Grusky, 2012). 
While no prior contributions have tracked potential changes in the mediating role of education 
in social class mobility (OD conditional on E), the three-way interaction between education, class 
origins, and class destinations has been at the center of a number of important contributions to the 
literature on social class mobility. Most notably, Hout (1984, 1988) found a lower intergenerational 
class association among college graduates and proposed that this interaction may account for much of 
the observed mobility trends. Through this “compositional effect“ (Breen & Jonsson, 2005), 
educational expansion is expected to increase social fluidity: the more individuals attain college 
education, the larger the share of the population whose social destinations are less dependent on their 
social origins. This lower OD association among college graduates could result from less 
discriminatory recruitment in labor market segments that are exclusively available to the highly 
educated (Torche, 2016).3 The compositional effect has also been detected in other countries (Breen, 
(Contd.)                                                                   
origins and a constantly high rate of occupational inheritance among farmers violates this assumption and biases the 
marginal adjustments used to make mobility tables from different cohorts comparable (Long & Ferrie, 2013, p. 2016f.). 
Consequently, the finding of rising fluidity may merely reflect “the discrepancy of the conditional distribution of farmers’ 
fathers from the marginal distribution of all fathers” (Xie & Killewald, 2013, p. 2017). 
3 An alternative interpretation of the OED interaction effect has been proposed by Goldthorpe (2007, p. 161), who suggests 
that it is not the relationship between origins and destinations that differs by education (OD conditional on E) but the 
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2010), in more recent cohorts of U.S. college graduates, and in other dimensions of socio-economic 
associations, such as family income, parental occupational status, and parental education (Torche, 
2011, 2016).4 Finally, the compositional effect has been confirmed, as suspected by Hout, to account 
for most of the observed mobility trends among American men (Pfeffer & Hertel, 2015). 
 
Gender Differences in Mobility 
In many ways, trends in educational and occupational attainment were even more radical for American 
women and can thus be expected to heavily influence female mobility rates over the century. While 
male dominated agricultural and manual origins declined, mixed or female dominated non-manual 
classes grew, resulting in structurally induced upward mobility. Growing educational attainment and 
improved employment prospects should facilitate women’s rise in the occupational structure, their 
ability to avoid downward mobility, and their capacity to reproduce their father’s (higher) class status. 
In effect, we would expect convergence of gender difference in the class structure as women access 
middle-class positions formerly restricted to men (England, 2010, 2011). 
Abstracting from these structural changes, expectations about gender differences in mobility 
(i.e. relative mobility) are unclear. Prior evidence is mixed: employing a period design, Mitnik et al. 
(2016, p. 159 (Table 4A) find that social fluidity significantly increased among women but not men of 
all age groups between the 1970s and 1990s and decreased again in the 2000s. In contrast, Beller 
(2009, p. 523) finds a decrease in relative mobility (though statistically insignificant) for women born 
between 1965 and 1979 compared to those born between 1945 and 1954 – a trend that she also 
determined to be similar to that for men, especially when additionally considering mother’s class. 
Furthermore, the substantive interpretation of gender differences in social fluidity trends calls 
for considerable care. For instance, Goldthorpe and collaborators caution against interpreting findings 
of increasing fluidity for women as proof of expanding opportunity for women (Goldthorpe & Mills, 
2004, 2008; Bukodi et al., 2015). They find that rising fluidity for British women resulted from a 
decreasing association between origins and destinations in the highest classes (Bukodi et al., 
unpublished).5 In other words, rather than female progress, in this case it is the decreasing ability of 
higher-class women to reproduce their family status that drives increasing fluidity trends. In our own 
analyses, we are therefore careful to interpret changing gender differences in mobility not only in 
terms of overall levels of fluidity; we also investigate mobility patterns to render potential gender 
differences in fluidity more substantively meaningful. 
 
3. Data and Measures 
We base our analyses on four different surveys, each of which had to meet two criteria to be 
considered for inclusion in this study. First, we require detailed information on each respondent’s 
education and occupation as well as their father’s occupation during the respondent’s childhood. 
Second, the surveys have to comprise nationally representative samples of adults in the United States. 
The four datasets that qualify are the General Social Survey (GSS), the Occupational Changes in a 
Generation Survey (OCG-II), the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). In the following, we briefly present each dataset before adding 
more detail on our analytic sample and the measures used. 
The GSS is one of the cornerstone datasets of U.S. social sciences and currently covers the 
years from 1972 until 2014 (Smith et al., 2015). It was conducted as a cross-sectional survey annually 
(Contd.)                                                                   
relation between education and destinations that differs by origin (ED conditional on O). That is, the link between 
education and social class is weaker among individuals with high social class backgrounds, presumably because higher 
class families can achieve social reproduction also outside the educational system. This interpretation is also in line with 
findings from Great Britain that document how individuals from higher social origins successfully use further education 
to correct for initial educational failures (Bukodi, 2016).  
4 Torche (2011) also documented a re-emergence of the OD association among those with a post-graduate degree. We revisit 
this finding in the analyses below. 
5 In ongoing work, Bukodi et al. (unpublished) speculate that family-orientation (and, we add, the lack of arrangements that 
help balance family demands with work demands) may inhibit these women from utilizing the full force of their 
privileged upbringing.  
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from 1972 until 1993, with the exception of 1979 and 1981, and biannually from 1994 onwards. The 
sample universe includes all English-speaking and, since 2006, Spanish-speaking adults of 18 years of 
age or older living in the United States. 
OCG-II was conducted as a supplement to the 1973 March Current Population Survey, CPS 
(Featherman & Hauser, 1975). As such, it is a nationally representative cross-sectional survey 
covering civilian, non-institutional households in the United States with an oversample of people of 
color and Hispanics. 
The SIPP is a household survey designed as a continuous series of nationally representative 
panels administered from 1984 onwards. Its sample includes civilian, non-institutionalized 
households. Here, we use the three waves from the SIPP panel that run between 1986 and 1988 
(Census, 1989, 1990b, 1990a, 1991b, 1991a, 1992). 
Finally, the PSID (McGonagle et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2014) is the world’s longest-running 
nationally representative household panel study. Its sample includes tracking children born to PSID 
households as they move out and establish their own households, providing the major data source for 
the assessment of intergenerational associations in the United States. The PSID includes an 
oversample of poor, African-American households and has been administered yearly since 1968 and 
bi-annually since 1997. Analyses of the influence of panel attrition on the study of intergenerational 
transmission of economic status attest to high representativeness (Fitzgerald, 2011). An inverse 
relationship between attrition probability and educational attainment, however, seems to downwardly 
bias estimates of intergenerational income elasticities with the PSID data (Schoeni & Wiemers, 2015). 
For this contribution, we use data from the most recent wave in 2013 supplemented by information 
from the two last waves for recent panel drop-outs. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Our overall analytic sample consists of 76,575 individuals (47,809 men and 28,766 women) aged 35 to 
64 who lived in the United States when they were of school-age and who were not in education when 
interviewed. We divide our sample into six birth cohorts, covering cohorts born roughly before, during 
and after WWI (1908-1921), before and after the crash of 1929 (1922-1933), the phase of economic 
recession and WWII (1934-1945), post-WWII (1946-1957), during the period of Fordism in the late 
1950s and 1960s (1958-1969), and during the 1970s (1970-1979). We typically label our cohort 
members by the years they turned 30 to help focus on the time period in which they completed their 
educational attainment and established their labor market careers. The composition of the cohorts with 
regard to some socio-demographic attributes is displayed in Table 1. Most importantly, we note that 
African-Americans are overrepresented whereas other racial and ethnic groups, importantly including 
Hispanics, are underrepresented in the most recent cohorts. 
We base our measure of social class destinations on respondents’ reports of their current 
occupations and our measure of social class origins on respondents’ retrospective reports of their 
fathers’ occupations during their own childhood. We recoded this occupational information into the 
EGP class scheme6, collapsed into six social class categories: higher service class (I), lower service 
class (II), routine non-manual workers (IIIab for men, IIIa for women), self-employed and farmers 
(IVabc), skilled manual workers and supervisors (VI+V), and unskilled manual workers (VIIab for 
men, VIIab+IIIb for women).7 Respondents’ educational attainment is measured as the highest degree 
                                                     
6 The surveys included here relied on different occupational coding schemes. The 1970 Census Occupational Classifications 
(COC) was used in OCG-II and early GSS waves, 1980 COC in later GSS waves and the SIPP, and 2000 COC in the 
most recent waves of the PSID. Changing occupational coding schemes have hindered prior research from assessing 
long-term social mobility. Besides the use of existing crosswalks from 2000-based to 1980-based EGP codes, we also 
draw on extensive work that devised a new crosswalk from 1970-based to 1980-based EGP codes (for deteils see Hertel 
& Groh-Samberg, 2014) .Validation checks for these latter crosswalks based on three double-coded GSS waves are 
reported in Appendix Table A. 1. We also note that this crosswalk has been used successfully in prior research to 
describe class mobility in the U.S. (Hertel & Groh-Samberg, 2014; Hertel, 2015; Pfeffer & Hertel, 2015). 
7 We lack information on the number of employees that would allow us to differentiate between the self-employed with (IVa) 
and without employees (IVb). The developers of the EGP scheme recommend collapsing low skilled manual workers 
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attained in the following five categories: less than high school, high school, some college (including 
associate’s degree), bachelor’s degree and post-graduate degrees. For the assessment of relative 
mobility trends among women, we had to collapse the two lowest educational degrees, less than high 
school and high school, to counter the effect of sparse cells on the stability of our models. 
We impute missing values on our main measures of education, destination, and origin using 
the Stata mi command (see Table 1), not least to adjust for the changing labor force participation of 
women and changes in the unemployment rate.8 The inspection of imputed values indicates that 
individuals from low class backgrounds, low educated Americans and incumbents of lower classes are 
especially likely to be missing. The structure of missing values suggests that by ignoring observations 
with missing data, we might overestimate mobility in cells indicating (educational) immobility in the 
lowest social positions (Schoeni & Wiemers, 2015). The results reported here remain substantively the 
same when we restrict the analyses to complete observations (see Appendix, Figure A. 3). Further 
sensitivity analyses, reported in the Appendix, also add confidence that our findings are not only stable 
to a wide range of different approaches to treating missing values, but that they are also stable towards 
differences in the characteristics of the four surveys, different sample constructions, and different 
specifications of our social class measure (Table A. 6, Figure A. 2, and Figure A. 3). 
 
Structural Changes in the Labor Market and Education  
As our brief historical overview above suggests, we expect dramatic changes in the two societal 
features that are at the heart of this assessment, the occupational and the educational structure. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
In terms of shifts in educational distribution, many empirical contributions have already described the 
rapid pace of educational expansion during much of the 20th century and its tapering off over the past 
three decades (Fischer & Hout, 2006; Goldin & Katz, 2008; Garfinkel et al., 2010). As Figure 1 
demonstrates (see also Table 2, upper two panels), our own data capture these trends well. The share 
of 35 to 64 year old individuals with a college degree or more rose rapidly and linearly in the first four 
cohorts studied here (who turned 30 between 1938 and 1987) and at a similar pace for men (from 10.8 
to 30.6 percent) and women (from 7.7 to 26.7 percent). Over the two most recent cohorts (who turned 
30 between 1988 and 2009), the share of individuals with at least a post-secondary degree has 
remained stable for men but continued to increase for women to surpass the share of male degree 
holders (34.7 vs. 30.3 percent). These trends are mirrored at the lower level of the educational 
distribution, where high school dropout rates decreased sharply and linearly among men (from 52.3 to 
7.9 percent) and women (from 44.4 to 7.5 percent) alike.9 These trends, once again, underline the 
dramatic success in expanding education during most of the last century and the ebbing of that trend in 
recent decades. 
 
(Contd.)                                                                   
with routine non-manual workers if analyses are performed separately for men and women (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992, 
p. 44). 
8 We did not rely on last job reported in the case of unemployment or inactivity at the time of the survey for three reasons: 
first, this information is not available in all surveys. Second, in some surveys where it is available, we do not know how 
far this measurement lies in the past, which potentially introduces severe bias by confounding cohort and life-course 
effects (especially with regard to women who stopped working relatively young, e.g. after marriage or giving birth) and 
undermines our sample restriction with regard to age. Third, episodes of unemployment are known to frequently precede 
downward occupational mobility  (Gangl, 2003, 2004), which indicates that using the last job systematically 
underestimates mobility. Instead, our imputations predict missing values based on the observed relationships between our 
key variables (origin, education, destination and cohort) and imposes that same relationship – which of course also 
derives from mobility inducing life events – to incomplete observations. 
9 Because female high school dropouts are becoming so few in more recent birth cohorts, we group them together with high 
school graduates in all following analysis unless noted otherwise. Especially in the loglinear cohort models, this should 
prevent any undue influence of the shrinking and increasingly selective group of female high school dropouts on results 
of cohort change in relative mobility (Xie & Killewald, 2013). 
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
Figure 2 (see also Table 2, bottom two panels) shows cohort changes in the class structure during the 
same period. Highly skilled white-collar positions (the “high service” class) expanded substantially in 
the first three cohorts of American men (from 17.8 to 24.5 percent) and in the first four cohorts of 
women (from 5.0 to 14.2 percent). Over the following cohorts, the service class slowly declined to 
17.4 percent for men and 12.8 percent for women in the most recent cohort. On the other hand, the 
share of lower-grade professionals and managers (“low service” class) rose steadily across cohorts 
from 7.9 to 18.7 percent for men and from 12.8 to 28.3 percent for women in the youngest cohort.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Trends in the share of unskilled workers reflect deindustrialization. The initial steep decline of 
unskilled manual positions, from 32.9 to 22.5 percent for men and 49.9 to 27.2 percent for women 
over the first four cohorts, is offset by emerging positions in the low-wage personal services segment 
within the working classes (Kalleberg, 2000, 2006). The share of skilled manual positions, the 
stronghold of male employment (England, 2011), remained virtually unchanged, accounting for about 
22 percent for men and less than 4 percent for women. Routine non-manual labor (around 8 percent) 
shows no pronounced cohort trends among men but declined among women from 23.5 in the oldest to 
17.0 percent in the most recent cohort, a trend likely to be driven by substituting computers for routine 
office work (Autor et al., 2003; England & Boyer, 2009). Self-employed within and outside of 
agriculture accounted for about 11 percent of men in each cohort, whereas their share increased among 
women from 5.0 to 8.4 percent. This trend results from the decline of male-dominated farming and the 
more recent increase of less gender-segregated self-employment outside of agriculture (Arum & 
Müller, 2004; Arum, 2007).  
 
4. Trends in Absolute Social Mobility 
To provide a parsimonious description of the changing flows between class origins and destinations 
across our cohorts (6 destination classes by 6 origin classes by 6 cohorts = 216 data points), we 
describe trends in absolute class mobility at different levels of aggregation (see also Erikson & 
Goldthorpe, 1992, pp. 44-45; Breen, 2004a): We first investigate immobility and mobility, i.e. the 
main-diagonal and off-diagonal cells of the mobility table. We then further differentiate cases of 
mobility into vertical and non-vertical moves: vertical moves can occur between the (combined low 
and high) service class at the top, and the unskilled working class at the bottom, and a broad middle-
class category that encompasses routine non-manuals, self-employed and skilled workers.10 
Intergenerational movement between these latter categories of the middle class, or between the low 
and the high service class, are counted as non-vertical moves. Finally, we further distinguish vertical 
mobility by its direction and reach: short downward mobility goes from the service class to the middle 
class and from the middle class to the unskilled working class and vice versa in the case of short 
upward mobility. Long downward mobility goes from the service class to the unskilled working class 
and vice versa for long upward mobility (lower panel). 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Given the vast changes in the class structure documented in the last section, we should expect 
considerable intergenerational movement between class origins and destinations, i.e. high individual 
class mobility. Figure 3 documents this to be the case (see also Table 3): across our entire sample, 71.1 
                                                     
10 We do not place farmers in different vertical categories depending on whether origins or destinations are concerned, as 
suggested by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992, pp. 45-46). Since our study covers such a long time window – our cohorts 
span nearly a century – it is not easy to identify the point at which farming origins or destinations cease to be structurally 
similar to unskilled working classes and become part of middle classes. Instead, we placed the self-employed in both 
origin and destination within the middle classes (Hout & Hauser, 1992). 
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percent of men and 78.8 percent of women experienced mobility. For men, this level of mobility is 
remarkably stable across all cohorts. Women, on the other hand, increasingly experienced immobility, 
up from initially 17.9 percent in the first cohort to 23.7 percent in the most recent cohort. Women’s 
decreasing mobility rates may result in part from the decreasing gender segregation in the class 
structure (Charles & Grusky, 2004; England, 2010, 2011; Blau et al., 2013): Over time, women were 
able to gain more access to middle-class occupations that had been restricted to men – in other words, 
they were increasingly able to reproduce their father’s class status.11 Non-vertical mobility – i.e. 
intergenerational movement within the middle or the highest classes  decreased slightly among men 
and women from initially 16.4 and 17.3, respectively, to 15.8 percent for both by the last cohort. These 
trends result from decreasing outflow rates from farming origins into skilled working and non-manual 
routine positions, which are only partially replaced in later cohorts by increasing mobility within the 
service class. Vertical mobility, consequently, rose across cohorts among men from 53.9 to 56.1 
percent but declined among women from 64.9 to 60.5 percent. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Absolute Mobility and Education 
Here, we relate social mobility as experienced by individuals (absolute mobility) to their educational 
experiences. We begin by tracking class gaps in educational attainment, then education gaps in social 
class attainment, and finally highlight differences in mobility related to educational attainment. 
 
Class Gaps in Educational Attainment 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Figure 4 illustrates differences in the shape of educational expansion for individuals from different 
social class backgrounds. It plots the share of individuals from each social class whose educational 
attainment does not go beyond a high school degree (upper panel) as well as individuals who attained 
a 4-year college degree or more (lower panel). The cohort trends first and foremost reveal that class 
gaps in education are large and have not decreased. This holds in spite of educational expansion, 
reflected in the overall decrease of men and women who attain at most a high school degree and an 
increase of men and women who attain at least a college degree. In fact, we find growing class gaps 
especially in the attainment of a college degree: the percentage point difference between the share of 
college graduates originating from high service class vs. the unskilled working classes increased for 
men from 28.9 to 38.6, and more rapidly for women from 17.0 to glaring 41.9 percentage points. 
These findings once again underline that the highest classes were most successful in taking advantage 
of the new educational opportunities created by educational expansion. 
 
Education Gaps in Class Attainment  
Class attainment is determined by a multitude of factors, but an important one among them is 
educational attainment (Blau & Duncan, 1967). Figure 5 displays cohort changes in the class position 
of men (upper panel) and women (lower panel) by their attained educational level (see online 
appendix Table A. 3 for full tables). 
We observe that Americans who maximally obtained a high school degree have benefitted the 
least from the upgrading of the occupational structure. For the lowest educated Americans, the 
decrease in unskilled work was less pronounced than among the general population: among men with 
at most a high school degree it decreased from 38.9 to 35.9 percent (32.9 vs. 24.3 in the general 
                                                     
11 Another way to illustrate this is by means of the index of dissimilarity (DI; see Breen, 2004) to summarize the share of 
women who would have to change classes in order for their origin (=fathers’) and destination distributions to be equal 
(DI=0). For women, the DI halved across the cohorts studied here, from 58.7 to 27.5 percent. While the DI for the 
comparison between the class distributions of men and their fathers is smaller, it also declined over cohorts, from 27.1 to 
10.2 percent. 
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population) and among women it decreased from 54.6 to 51.5 percent (49.9 to 30.0 percent in the 
general population). Reflecting the increasing importance of higher education, access to the service 
class declined among low educated men from initially 15.8 to 13.1 percent. This trend is particularly 
marked among male high-school drop-outs in our sample (not shown separately). None of the drop-
outs born after 1970 gained access to the higher service class, while it was still a possibility – though 
small at 6.2 percent – for the earliest cohort. The trends are markedly different for low educated 
women: those with at most a high school degree were increasingly able to enter the (mostly lower) 
service classes, with their share increasing from 12.0 to 20.3 percent.  
The occupational opportunities of Americans who access college but do not graduate with a 
bachelor’s degree are also increasingly dire. While service-class positions declined (from 49.3 to 31.6 
percent among men and 47.1 to 35.5 percent among women), the rate of unskilled working-class 
positions increased substantially (from 13.6 to 26.3 percent among men and from 17.7 to 27.5 percent 
among women). 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
A bachelor’s degree became increasingly important for access to the middle classes: the share of 
middle-class positions among BA holders increased for males (from 23.0 to 27.4 percent) and, more 
so, for females (from 20.6 to 29.3 percent). Yet, even among college graduates, the share of 
individuals who made it into the service class declined. The BA degree was a more reliable way to 
access the top of the class structure when college graduation rates were lower, a process customarily 
called credential inflation (Collins, 1979, 2011): while close to three quarters of college graduates in 
our first cohort entered the service class (above 72 percent for women and men), the same was true for 
fewer college graduates in our latest cohort (66.9 percent for men and 61.0 for women). Instead, 
women who graduated with a Bachelor’s degree increasingly even worked at unskilled working-class 
jobs (up from 4.8 to 9.8 percent).12 
Finally, the class destination of post-graduate degree holders has remained quite stable across 
cohorts – that is, contrary to BA degrees, we do not find evidence (yet) for inflation in credentials at 
the very top of the educational distribution. Around 90 percent of men and above 80 percent of women 
with an advanced degree find their way into the service class. The slight increase of middle-class 
positions among postgraduates is mostly driven by graduates who become self-employed (not shown). 
 
Education and Mobility Experiences 
The documented changes in class gaps in education and in educational gaps in class attainment do not 
yet provide a direct answer to what many may consider the central question about changes in the role 
of education: namely, has education and, in particular, higher education become more important as a 
gateway to upward mobility? Figure 6 provides a direct and rather clear answer. 
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
Overall, upward mobility among college graduates has been decreasing while immobility has 
increased. In other words, college degrees have become a more important means to maintain one’s 
social class status, i.e. a reproductive strategy (Torche, 2011). With the important exception of 
changes between the first and second cohort of males – where the importance of higher education for 
upward mobility increased – these trends are similar for both genders but more pronounced for males. 
For males, rates of immobility and upward mobility among college degree holders reached parity 
earlier than for women and then reversed, leaving the youngest cohort of male college graduates with 
considerably higher rates of immobility than upward mobility. 
                                                     
12 However, the continuous decline of class attainment among female BA holders is however not another instance in which 
increasing mobility is caused by women’s failure to reproduce high class positions as it seems to be the case in Britain 
(Bukodi et al., unpublished): long- and short-range downward mobility among female college graduates remained stable. 
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The initial increase in upward mobility solely among male college graduates turning 30 
between 1953 and 1962 is likely to be driven by returning World War II and Korean War veterans. 
Around 75 and 60 percent of men born between 1920 and 1926 served in one of these wars and around 
50 to 60 percent of veterans born between 1923 and 1928 benefitted from the educational provisions 
granted under the G.I. Bill (Bound & Turner, 2002; Turner & Bound, 2003). Benefits included tuition 
fees and a monthly allowance for occupational training, apprenticeships or university studies that were 
high enough to study even at the most prestigious institutions of higher education. 
Overall, our assessment of education’s role in absolute mobility trends leaves us with a 
substantially less optimistic view of changes in access to opportunity than one may have expected 
based on many positive aggregate trends: education has expanded significantly, important parts of the 
occupational structure have been upgraded, and overall upward mobility has increased. Still, class 
differentials in access to education are stable and absolute class returns to education have in important 
ways declined (e.g. in terms of a college degree guaranteeing access to the service class). What we 
observe is an instance of continuously maintained inequality in absolute terms. While the opportunity 
structure became more favorable for everyone, the privileged classes were most successful in 
benefitting from these advances. At the same time, women profited more strongly than men from the 
amelioration of the opportunity structure even though they still trail behind men when it comes to the 
mobility returns to their education. 
 
5. Social Fluidity and Education 
Analyses of changes in absolute mobility rates and changes in relative mobility rates, or social fluidity, 
address different questions. We now turn to the topic of social fluidity and, with that, an answer to the 
question of whether and how the United States has come closer or moved away from its ideal, the land 
of equal opportunity. We begin with an assessment of how social fluidity varies across educational 
status (the compositional effect) and how the role of education varies across different patterns of 
mobility. We then report two-way associations between origin, education, and destination to describe 
trends in each of the three legs of the “mobility triad”. Uniting these findings in a final decomposition 
analysis, we describe the channels that account for the observed changes in social fluidity. We end 
with a closer look at the changing fluidity patterns of women and their determinants. 
 
The compositional effect 
Figure 7 displays the strength of the association between class origins and destinations for each of the 
five educational degrees. This OD association is now derived from uniform difference models (Xie 
1992; Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992) to reflect the degree of social fluidity, i.e. social mobility levels 
that subtract structural mobility induced by changes in the overall occupational structure. We confirm 
the compositional effect found in prior research: intergenerational class associations tend to decrease 
with the level of attained education (Hout, 1988). In line with Torche (2011), we also find that the 
origin-destination association decreases up to a graduate degree but then increases slightly (and, in this 
case, insignificantly) among male postgraduates, whereas the intergenerational association declines 
gradually for women and with no difference between graduates and post-graduates (Torche, 2016). 
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
How important is education for class mobility? 
Having described how class origins matter differently for class attainment across educational status, 
we now assess whether education also matters for relative mobility chances. To answer this question, 
we employ a method proposed by Breen, Karlson and Holm (Breen et al., 2013; Breen & Karlson, 
2014) that allows us to estimate the mediating role of education for each origin-destination 
combination, analogous to the assessment of mediation in linear regression models.13 Table 4 reports 
                                                     
13 The challenge for mediation analysis in non-linear models, such as logistic regression, stems from the fact that coefficient 
estimates and their error variance are not separately identified because the scale of the predicted latent variable is 
unknown (Mood, 2010). If new variables are added to an existing model, all coefficients are subject to rescaling, which 
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the degree to which educational attainment mediates mobility from a given class origin (relative to a 
service-class origin) to a given class destination (relative to a service-class destination). For example, 
little more than one third (37 percent) of the total intergenerational association among men who 
originate in the routine non-manual class rather than the service class, and remain there rather than 
move into the service class, is mediated by education. This particularly low mediation effect and the 
fact that most effects presented in Table 4 are far below 100 percent underlines the importance of 
(higher) education for mobility strategies “from above”, i.e. from and into the service classes 
(Goldthorpe, 2007, p. 171). 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Nevertheless, education mediates more than half of the origin-destination association in almost all 
cells of the mobility table and significantly more in many, underlining education’s primary importance 
for class mobility. Distinguishing between immobility (main diagonal) and mobility (off-diagonal) 
provides the following further insights: the role of education tends to be substantially lower for 
immobility than for mobility, suggesting that overall education is still an important positive 
contributor to a fluid society.14 This finding that immobility is less strongly associated with 
educational attainment also points both towards the importance of other factors that inhibit class 
mobility and towards the fact that education is particularly important for class immobility in the 
reference group (service class I+II). 
A comparison between men and women suggests that education tends to be more important 
for relative mobility chances among women. Especially cells pertaining to upward mobility chances 
(values below the main diagonal) are frequently above 100%, indicating that women need to acquire 
more (or more specific) education to outweigh gender disadvantage in terms of class attainment. 
Education is especially important for women from farming backgrounds to enter routine non-manual 
or self-employed positions. 
 
Trends in Fluidity and the Mobility Triad 
Having established the importance of education for social fluidity, we now turn back to the assessment 
of cohort trends. We estimate a series of log-linear and log-multiplicative models of the two-way 
association between origins and destinations (OD), origins and education (OE), and education and 
destinations (ED) (for details about these models, see Breen, 2010). The usual fit statistics are 
presented in Table 5, alongside UniDiff parameter estimates, which are also plotted in Figure 8. 
 
[Figure 8 about here] 
 
We begin by discussing the results for men. We find strong indications for a change in men’s social 
fluidity across cohorts (OD): both the linear UniDiff and unconstrained UniDiff models are superior to 
the constant association model (see log-likelihood ratio test statistics [p vs. #] for models 1.2 and 1.3 
in Table 5). For one additional parameter, the linear UniDiff model reduces deviance by 81.9 percent 
(203.2/248.1) compared to the constant association model. The linear decline in the OD association, 
i.e. increase in fluidity, estimated by this model is 5.7% for each cohort. Inspecting the UniDiff 
(Contd.)                                                                   
complicates comparisons between the coefficients of nested models (or across samples). To account for the rescaling, the 
KHB decomposition method (Breen et al., 2013; Breen & Karlson, 2014) substitutes the mediator variable (education) 
with the residuals of the mediator variable obtained in a regression of the mediator variables on the predictor variables of 
interest (origin classes). These residualized mediators can then be used to calculate total and indirect effects. While the 
coefficients of the models (total, direct and, their difference, the indirect effect) still cannot be compared across samples, 
their ratios can, since the common scale parameters cancel out. 
14 The role of education for immobility is particularly low for the petty bourgeoisie – the self-employed in (IVc) and outside 
of agriculture (IVab). Likely, immobility in these classes is instead more heavily driven by inherited capital, such as 
investment capital, land, machines, or the business/farm itself rather than by obtaining academic skills (Ishida et al., 
1995). The exception to the pattern of lower mediation of immobility, are women from high grade routine non-manual 
origins for whom education plays a larger role in the reproduction of their class status. 
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parameters that are not constrained to a linear trend (model 1.3) in Figure 8, however, shows that the 
increase in fluidity across cohorts was strong across the initial four cohorts but leveled off for men 
who turned 30 in the mid 1970s or later. We do not find evidence for a decline in fluidity among men 
born in the most recent cohort as reported by Beller (2009), Mitnik et al. (2016) and our own earlier 
analysis (Pfeffer & Hertel, 2015).15 The overall trend of increased fluidity among men parallels 
findings from nine out of ten European countries over a similar time frame (Breen, 2004a).  
In line with earlier research, we do not observe a substantial trend towards lower inequality of 
educational opportunity among men (OE). Neither the linear (2.2) nor the unconstrained UniDiff 
model (2.3) yield a significantly better fit than the constant association model (2.1). An inspection of 
the UniDiff parameters suggests that, at best, the trends in class inequality in educational attainment 
may be U-shaped: class differences in educational attainment were declining from an initially high 
level, remained stable between the second and the fifth cohort only to return to their initial level in the 
last cohort. This result – though suggestive, since we cannot reject a model of no trend – corroborates 
findings by Roksa et al. (2007, pp. 181-182) according to which class inequality in access to elite 
universities was higher in the pre-WWII cohort as well as cohorts entering higher education in the 
1980s compared to cohorts in-between. Possibly, the initial decline that we find was driven by 
educational provisions for returning veterans (Bound & Turner, 2002), whereas educational expansion 
and affirmative action programs following the civil right movements may have led to its subsequent 
stability on the lower level (Karen, 1991; Katznelson, 2005; Roksa et al., 2007). The final increase of 
the association between class origins and educational attainment coincides with the retrenchment of 
affirmative action in higher education, starting in the 1980s, and increasing tuition costs at times of 
widening income inequality (Roksa et al., 2007; Hout, 2012). 
Finally, we observe that class returns to education (ED) for men fluctuate across cohorts 
without a clear trend. While the linear UniDiff model (3.2) fails to improve fit over the constant 
association model (3.1), the unconstrained UniDiff model (3.3) provides a moderately better fit. Those 
UniDiff parameter estimates suggest that there is little change over the first three cohorts, a unique 
reduction in the fourth cohort, and a subsequent increase in the returns to education.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Our findings for women are quite different. We find no evidence for a trend in increasing fluidity 
(OD). The linear (1.2) as well as the unconstrained (1.3) UniDiff models fail to improve model fit over 
the constant association model (1.1). Inspection of the UniDiff parameters suggests that mobility 
chances may have increased somewhat between the first and the second cohort but not since. Research 
from other countries has found both increasing and decreasing fluidity levels for women (Breen & 
Luijkx, 2004b). Female fluidity trends in the U.S. appear to resemble those in Germany, Italy, Britain 
and Israel where women’s fluidity levels also remained unchanged for most of the 20th century (Breen 
& Luijkx, 2004a, p. 388). The stability of fluidity among women is thus not an exception but certainly 
a new enough finding for the U.S. context that merits further inspection, which we engage in below. 
Our results for women are also in line with findings from a recent period analysis of intergenerational 
associations in occupational status: studying trends across roughly five-year intervals between 1972 
and 2010, Torche (2016, p. 247f.) found a substantial decline in women’s intergenerational association 
in the mid-1980s, followed by a quarter century of overall stability. 
                                                     
15 Additional analyses reveal that this difference is mainly due to the inclusion of the PSID (see online Appendix, Figure A. 
1, bottom right plot). This may be due to two features of these data: first, the PSID comprises a higher share of African 
Americans, who show more fluidity in this cohort (Hertel, 2015, p. 257). Also, Mitnik et al.’s finding that the recent 
decrease in fluidity is primarily driven by immobility in the highest classes suggests that the inclusion of African-
Americans, who are more heavily concentrated in lower class positions, would counter the trend of decreasing fluidity. 
Second, a recent study by Schoeni and Wiemers (2015) indicates that panel attrition downwardly biases observed 
intergenerational income elasticities based on PSID data. If this effect of selective attrition also holds for 
intergenerational class associations, we may overestimate fluidity in the last two cohorts in which PSID data account for 
42.6 and 72.4 percent of our analytic sample. 
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Unlike men, American women gained considerably in terms of class equality in educational 
opportunity. Both the linear and the unconstrained UniDiff model (2.2 and 2.3, respectively) increase 
model fit significantly compared to the constant association model (2.1). The association between 
class origins and education declines by almost 4.4% per cohort; Figure 8 emphasizes that this change 
is almost linear. This finding aligns well with other research showing that American women have 
made substantial inroads in access to higher education over the last century (Diprete & Buchmann, 
2006; Roksa et al., 2007, p. 173). 
Finally, we also find that class returns to education declined significantly among women. Both 
versions of the UniDiff model (3.2 and 3.3) significantly outperform the constant association model 
(3.1). Contrary to men, however, we find a constant decline of class returns to education among 
women. This may suggest a kind of “perverse fluidity” (Goldthorpe & Mills, 2004, 2008) that could 
be driven by an increasing share of higher educated women experiencing downward mobility (e.g. 
after child bearing and rearing). 
 
Channels of Changing Fluidity 
Three distinct mechanisms might drive the trends in social fluidity (for men) and lack thereof (for 
women) that we have observed above: educational expansion, changes in class inequality in 
educational opportunity, and changes in class returns to education. Employing the decomposition 
method introduced by Breen (Breen, 2010), we investigate how much each of these channels 
contributes to the observed trends in social fluidity. Since these trends are flat for women, here the 
counterfactual models illustrate how fluidity would have changed if these channels were primarily 
driving them. 
 
[Figure 9 about here] 
 
Figure 9 shows the UniDiff parameter estimates for each cohort fitted to the actual observed mobility 
tables (O) as well as to counterfactual mobility tables. The additive step-wise inclusion allows for the 
influence of (1) educational expansion, (2) the compositional effect, (3) changes in inequality of 
education, and (4) changes in returns to education. We follow this incremental approach by comparing 
how much each counterfactual mobility trend improves upon the prior counterfactual scenario (starting 
with a counterfactual baseline model B that restricts all relevant influences of education to be stable) 
and approaches the observed fluidity trend.16 Table 6 additionally reports linear UniDiff parameter 
estimates and calculates the contribution of each counterfactual trend to the linear trend in fluidity 
estimated from the observed data. 
The results for American men lend additional credibility to earlier analysis based on less than 
half of our current sample (Pfeffer & Hertel, 2015): the single two most important drivers of the 
increase in fluidity among men are educational expansion (1) and the compositional effect (2). Other 
factors – namely trends in inequality in education (which, from above, we know were very muted) (3) 
and decreasing returns to education (4)  – add only very limited additional explanatory power (i.e. they 
do not move the counterfactual lines much closer to the observed trend), except for the second cohort, 
for which the equalization of educational opportunity is the only mechanism that holds explanatory 
power – as yet another strong suggestion of the positive effects of the G.I. bill (see above). In the 
linear UniDiff models, these four channels together account for roughly 70 percent of the linear 
increase in social fluidity among men. That is, changes related to education – and among them chiefly 
educational expansion and the compositional effect – are the main determinants of mobility trends. 
The remaining determinants of trends are those related to changes in the direct association between 
origins and destinations, outside of education. For instance, decreasing discrimination by social 
background in terms of hiring may account for an overall decrease in the residual association between 
                                                     
16 The method applied here closely follows the structure of decomposition outlined by (Breen, 2010). Though it differs from 
our earlier application in several ways (see Appendix A in Pfeffer & Hertel, 2015), the overall conclusions we derive are 
quite similar. 
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origins and destinations once education is taken into account and, though only to a limited degree, to 
improving fluidity levels (Erikson & Jonsson, 1998; Jackson et al., 2005; Hällsten, 2013). 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Our earlier analysis of women provided little evidence for changing levels of social fluidity. The 
counterfactual analysis sheds further light on how to interpret that finding: taking into account only 
increasing educational attainment among women (1), social fluidity would have decreased 
substantially over the last century since higher educational attainment made women more likely to 
inherit higher class positions. The compositional effect alone (2) does not provide additional 
explanatory power for the observed trend, which may be explained by our earlier observation 
according to which education is of greater relative importance for women’s overall mobility chances, 
reducing the role that the compositional effect can play (Torche, 2016, p. 239). Other trends appear to 
have effectively counterbalanced the fluidity-decreasing influence of educational expansion for 
women: beginning with the third cohort, both changes in inequality of educational opportunity and 
class returns to education worked to increase fluidity (the counterfactual trend lines are being pulled 
strongly towards higher fluidity). Together, these countervailing influences contributed to the stability 
of female fluidity levels. However, in the end, we also observe considerably larger differences 
between observed and counterfactual fluidity for women (distance between the counterfactual and 
observed lines), implying that factors other than those related to education have been important 
determinants of female fluidity levels. One candidate explanation for this includes the idea that 
women’s class attainment is constrained by gender segregation, especially in the highest and lowest 
class positions, and that this type of gender segregation at the highest levels has withstood the radical 
transformation of women’s educational attainment (England, 2011). 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this contribution, we have studied trends in absolute and relative social mobility over the 20th 
century in the United States based on a new data collection made up of four national surveys. We have 
paid particularly close attention to the question of how these trends relate to changes in education. 
Like others before us, we document massive changes in the occupational structure and the 
educational system of the United States. These changes are unsurprising given the large-scale 
transformations through industrialization and post-industrialization. But, in many ways, these 
aggregate trends paint a quite optimistic picture: the population became more educated and the 
occupational structure experienced upgrading that generally triggered upward mobility. Especially 
women benefitted consistently from the trend towards a post-industrial society, experiencing 
decreasing levels of downward mobility (while tendencies of polarization of the occupational structure 
also increased downward mobility for men). 
In contrast, our findings on the role of education in the mobility experienced by Americans 
(absolute mobility) provide little support for progress over the last century in the “great land of 
opportunity”, a description with which the U.S. has been branded since its founding days. Even the 
radical increase of higher educational attainment during much of the 20th century has not closed class 
gaps in educational attainment. On the contrary, gaps in college graduation rates between the highest 
and lowest classes have increased, supporting the view that educational expansion profited especially 
those families that had the economic and social resources to take advantage of growing educational 
opportunities. We also observe that absolute class returns to educational attainment have declined in 
particularly important dimensions of the class structure: while college attendance and graduation have 
become more important in order to access the middle class, even BA degrees have lost their power in 
ensuring access to the highest classes and increasingly lead to even unskilled working-class positions. 
It is post-graduate degrees that, so far, have continued to maintain their function as the gatekeeper to 
higher class status. The upgrading of both the educational and class structure, finally, also resulted in 
an increase of immobility among college graduates at the expense of upward mobility. For both male 
and female college graduates, immobility is a much more frequent experience today than it was for 
cohorts born in the first half of the 20th century. 
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Our assessment of changes in social fluidity levels and how they relate to changes in 
education reveals quite different stories for men and women. While class fluidity increased among 
men, it remained stable among women. Regarding the role of education in contributing to social 
fluidity, we find both gender commonalities and differences that help explain the diverging fluidity 
trends: for both men and women, a college degree is an important “equalizer” (Torche 2011) that 
reduces the direct link between social class origins and destinations (compositional effect). Moreover, 
education is of greater importance for women’s upward mobility than for men’s, i.e. women’s access 
to a higher class position is more restricted to selection via educational credentials. 
We find that the moderate increases in class fluidity among men are primarily driven by 
educational expansion and the compositional effect (see also Pfeffer & Hertel, 2015). That is, the 
weakening of intergenerational class associations for men was driven by the increasing share of 
college graduates but not by changes in class inequality in education, which remained stable, or 
changing returns to education, which were not marked by a consistent trend.  
For women, on the other hand, educational trends alone provide an incomplete explanation for 
the stability of fluidity levels: everything else equal, educational expansion alone had the potential to 
decrease female fluidity – chiefly since it elevated women’s qualifications and enabled them to gain 
access to occupations henceforth restricted to their fathers. This influence, however, was 
counterbalanced by a decreasing level of class inequality in educational attainment and the decreasing 
class returns to education, contributing in the remarkable stability of intergenerational class 
transmission from fathers to daughters. The stability of women’s relative mobility chances, however, 
is likely also in important parts a result of continued gender segregation in the labor market (Charles & 
Grusky, 2004). 
These new findings on the distinct mobility trends and determinants among women underline 
the need for further studies focused on women. Bukodi et al. (unpublished) recently embarked on that 
journey to study the development of mobility chances among British women. They found that 
increasing social fluidity among British women is almost entirely driven by women from high-class 
origins failing to achieve class reproduction. They speculate that family  and work-orientations of 
these women may account for their lower class attainment. Given the contrary finding of stable 
fluidity among American women, we would propose concentrating on other factors, including 
demographic factors (family structure and marital status) to help explain women’s mobility within the 
American context. Finally, the shape and determinants of female mobility could be greatly enlightened 
by an explicit comparative approach dedicated to the analysis of female mobility that also takes into 
consideration the vast difference in welfare provisions and the particular impact they have on female 
workers and mothers (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1993, 1999). 
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics by Birth Cohort 
   Year turned 30   
   1938‐
1951 
1952‐
1963 
1964‐
1975 
1976‐
1987 
1988‐
1999 
2000‐
2009  Total 
So
ur
ce
  GSS  21.0%  22.7%  34.2%  48.9%  57.4%  27.6%  35.3% 
SIPP  0.9%  27.9%  43.4%  34.7%  0.0%  0.0%  25.3% 
OCG‐II  78.2%  49.4%  22.2%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  27.3% 
PSID  0.0%  0.0%  0.2%  16.4%  42.6%  72.4%  12.1% 
De
m
og
ra
ph
ic
s  Women  11.8%  25.0%  39.6%  51.9%  53.7%  52.8%  37.6% 
Race               
   White  86.2%  87.0%  87.1%  81.9%  68.9%  62.8%  82.6% 
   Black   13.3%  12.2%  11.5%  15.3%  25.0%  27.0%  15.0% 
   Other  0.5%  0.8%  1.4%  2.9%  6.2%  10.3%  2.4% 
                 Imputed  35.6%  30.2%  28.6%  27.2%  29.7%  30.9%  29.8% 
  Observations  9,432  18,947  18,662  17,078  8,616  3,840  76,575 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014); see text for details. 
Figure 1: Changes in the Distribution of Education 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014).  
 
 
 
  
 
Table 2: Cohort Trends in Education and Class Structure 
  Year turned 30 
     
1938‐
1951 
1952‐
1963 
1964‐
1975 
1976‐
1987 
1988‐
1999 
2000‐
2009  Total 
Highest Education         
M
en
 
Less than HS  52.3%  37.3%  23.8%  11.1%  10.0%  7.9%  28.8% 
HS  28.5%  34.2%  38.9%  40.9%  49.1%  38.9%  36.9% 
Some college  8.4%  10.9%  13.4%  17.4%  13.9%  23.1%  12.9% 
BA  5.4%  8.3%  11.7%  17.3%  17.5%  19.2%  11.3% 
>BA  5.4%  9.3%  12.3%  13.3%  9.5%  10.9%  10.1% 
   100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
W
om
en
  Less than HS  44.4%  29.7%  18.4%  9.2%  8.3%  7.5%  16.1% HS  46.4%  49.3%  50.4%  47.1%  44.9%  33.1%  46.9% 
Some college  1.5%  9.3%  13.5%  16.9%  18.9%  24.7%  15.1% 
BA  5.7%  6.7%  9.8%  15.2%  18.0%  20.7%  12.9% 
>BA  2.1%  4.9%  7.9%  11.5%  10.0%  14.0%  9.1% 
   100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Destination Class          
M
en
 
High Service   17.8%  22.0%  24.5%  22.7%  20.9%  17.4%  21.7% 
Low Service   7.9%  10.0%  12.4%  13.9%  13.3%  18.7%  11.5% 
Routine NM  8.2%  7.9%  6.7%  7.7%  7.2%  7.9%  7.6% 
Self‐employed  10.7%  10.5%  11.0%  12.4%  12.0%  10.6%  11.1% 
Skilled Workers  22.4%  23.3%  21.8%  20.8%  21.2%  21.1%  22.1% 
Unskilled Workers  32.9%  26.3%  23.6%  22.5%  25.4%  24.3%  26.0% 
   100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
W
om
en
 
High Service   5.0%  8.6%  11.1%  14.2%  14.2%  12.8%  12.0% 
Low Service   12.8%  14.5%  19.1%  23.3%  24.0%  28.3%  20.8% 
Routine NM  23.5%  25.6%  25.6%  22.5%  18.6%  17.0%  22.8% 
Self‐employed  5.0%  7.6%  8.2%  8.8%  8.7%  8.4%  8.3% 
Skilled Workers  3.8%  3.3%  4.3%  4.1%  4.0%  3.5%  3.9% 
Unskilled Workers  49.9%  40.4%  31.6%  27.2%  30.5%  30.0%  32.1% 
      100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014).  
  
 
 
Figure 2: Changes in the Occupational Structure 
 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014). 
  
 
Figure 3: Trends in vertical absolute mobility and immobility across cohorts 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014). Mobility flows sum up by cohort to 100 
minus the share of non‐vertically mobile, which are mostly stable across cohorts (see Table 3). 
  
 
 
Table 3: Absolute mobility rates 
   Year turned 30 
            1938‐1951 1952‐1963 1964‐1975 1976‐1987 1988‐1999 2000‐2009  Total 
                     
M
en
 
Immobility  29.8%  28.2% 28.8% 29.0% 29.7%  28.1%  28.9%
Total Mobility  70.3%  71.8% 71.2% 71.0% 70.3%  71.9%  71.1%
w
ith
  Non‐vertical  16.4%  16.6% 15.5% 16.2% 15.1%  15.8%  16.1%
Vertical  53.9%  55.2% 55.7% 54.8% 55.2%  56.1%  55.1%
 
w
ith
  Long Up  4.5%  6.5% 7.7% 6.8% 6.0%  7.0%  6.5%  Short Up  24.5%  28.6% 29.1% 27.2% 24.9%  26.3%  27.4%
  Long Down  1.7%  1.3% 1.9% 2.8% 3.7%  4.4%  2.1%
   Short Down  23.3%  18.8% 17.0% 17.9% 20.5%  18.4%  19.1%
W
om
en
 
Immobility  17.9%  19.3% 20.3% 21.5% 23.8%  23.7%  21.2%
Total Mobility  82.1%  80.7% 79.7% 78.5% 76.2%  76.3%  78.8%
w
ith
  Non‐vertical  17.3%  20.1% 20.5% 18.7% 17.1%  15.8%  18.9%
Vertical  64.9%  60.5% 59.2% 59.8% 59.1%  60.5%  59.9%
 
w
ith
  Long Up  2.5%  4.0% 6.5% 7.8% 8.8%  9.5%  6.9%  Short Up  17.3%  21.2% 24.9% 27.9% 25.3%  27.0%  25.1%
  Long Down  3.3%  3.4% 3.2% 3.3% 4.2%  4.5%  3.5%
   Short Down  41.7%  32.0% 24.7% 20.9% 20.8%  19.6%  24.4%
Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset  (1972–2014). Up‐ and downward mobility add up to 
vertical  mobility.  Vertical  and  non‐vertical  mobility  add  up  to  total  mobility.  Any  differences  are  due  to 
rounding. 
  
 
Figure 4: Trends in (absolute) class gaps in education 
 Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014). Corresponding numbers are shown in 
Table A. 2 in the appendix. 
  
 
 
Figure 5: Absolute class attainment by educational attainment 
 Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014). Middle classes comprise routine non‐
manuals, self‐employed, farmers and skilled workers. Service classes comprise low and high positions in the 
salariat. All percentages are reported in Table A. 3 in the online appendix. 
  
 
 
Figure 6: Absolute mobility trends among university graduates 
 Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014). Mobility rates depicted are those of 
university graduates only. Downward mobility not shown (residual category). 
  
 
 
Figure 7: Strength of relative association between origin and destination by educational 
degree 
 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014); N = 47,809 men and 28,766 women. 
  
 
 
Table 4: The Role of Education as Mediator of Social Fluidity 
      Destination Class (ref. SC I+II) 
   Origin Class (ref. SC I+II)  IIIab  IVab  IVc  V/VI  VIIab 
M
en
 
Routine Non‐Manual (IIIa)  36.7%  n.s.  n.s.  93.1%  89.5% 
Self‐Employed (IVab)  77.5%  44.4%  49.3%  71.0%  79.2% 
Farmers (IVc)  93.9%  76.6%  25.5%  73.9%  68.8% 
Skilled Workers (V/VI)  74.9%  88.3%  72.5%  60.9%  68.8% 
Unskilled Workers (VIIab)  67.9%  84.4%  54.3%  69.6%  61.6% 
   Origin Class (ref. SC I+II)  IIIa  IVab  IVc  V/VI  VIIab+IIIb 
W
om
en
 
Routine Non‐Manual (IIIa)  107.4%  n.s.  13.7%  87.6%  76.1% 
Self‐Employed (IVab)  81.3%  49.0%  65.0%  68.1%  77.0% 
Farmers (IVc)  113.2%  122.4%  33.4%  76.5%  69.6% 
Skilled Workers (V/VI)  92.5%  133.6%  n.s.  65.6%  73.6% 
Unskilled Workers (VIIab+IIIb)  89.2%  115.4%  82.2%  67.6%  66.5% 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014); N = 47,809 men and 28,766 women. n.s. 
indicates  that  either  there  is  no  statistically  significant  relation  between  educational  attainment  and  class 
attainment or  that  there  is  no  correlation  between  class  origins  and  educational  attainment  (Kohler  et  al., 
2011, p. 424). 
  
 
Figure 8. Relative trends in two‐way associations between origin, destination, and education 
 
Note: Authors’  calculations based on  composite dataset  (1972–2014); N = 47,809 men  and 28,766 women. 
Dashed  lines  indicate that the UniDiff model  (#.3) does not significantly  increase model  fit over the constant 
fluidity model (p > 0.05). 
  
 
 
Table 5: Fit Statistics for Observed Trends in Mobility Components 
                p 
      G2  df  p  Δ  BIC  vs. #.1  vs. #.2 
M
en
 
ODC (Trends in Social Mobility) 
1.1 Constant  248.1  125  0.0000  0.022  ‐1,099     
1.2 Linear UniDiFF  203.2  124  0.0000  0.021  ‐1,133  0.0000   
1.3 UniDiFF  198.0  120  0.0000  0.021  ‐1,095  0.0000  0.2674 
OEC (Trends in Educational Inequality) 
2.1 Constant  166.9  100  0.0000  0.019  ‐911     
2.2 Linear UniDiFF  165.2  99  0.0000  0.019  ‐902  0.1923   
2.3 UniDiFF  158.5  95  0.0001  0.019  ‐865  0.1355  0.1526 
EDC (Trends in Educational Returns) 
3.1 Constant  233.3  100  0.0000  0.022  ‐844     
3.2 Linear UniDiFF  230.2  99  0.0000  0.021  ‐837  0.0783   
3.3 UniDiFF  220.2  95  0.0000  0.020  ‐803  0.0225  0.0404 
W
om
en
 
ODC (Trends in Social Mobility) 
1.1 Constant  201.5  125  0.0000  0.028  ‐1,082     
1.2 Linear UniDiFF  201.4  124  0.0000  0.028  ‐1,072  0.7518   
1.3 UniDiFF  200.6  120  0.0000  0.028  ‐1,031  0.9702  0.9385 
OEC (Trends in Educational Inequality) 
2.1 Constant  136.1  75  0.0000  0.021  ‐634     
2.2 Linear UniDiFF  127.0  74  0.0001  0.020  ‐633  0.0026   
2.3 UniDiFF  124.3  70  0.0001  0.020  ‐594  0.0376  0.6092 
EDC (Trends in Educational Returns) 
3.1 Constant  241.4  75  0  0.027  ‐528.6     
3.2 Linear UniDiFF  188.5  74  0  0.023  ‐571.3  0.0000   
3.3 UniDiFF  181.7  70  0  0.023  ‐537  0.0000  0.1468 
  UniDiff Parameters  Linear  C = 1  C = 2  C = 3  C = 4  C = 5  C = 6 
M
en
  OD (1.2 & 1.3)  ‐0.057  1  0.898  0.832  0.760  0.762  0.740 
OE (2.2 & 2.3)  ‐0.013  1  0.916  0.919  0.911  0.884  1.002 
ED (3.2 & 3.3)  ‐0.013  1  0.985  0.997  0.909  0.946  1.007 
W
om
en
  OD (1.2 & 1.3)  ‐0.007  1  0.908  0.881  0.883  0.893  0.900 
OE (2.2 & 2.3)  ‐0.044  1  1.022  0.892  0.844  0.820  0.816 
ED (3.2 & 3.3)  ‐0.064  1  0.801  0.733  0.651  0.613  0.596 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014); N = 47,809 men and 28,766 women. 
  
 
Figure 9: Mechanisms behind social fluidity trends 
 Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014); N = 47,809 men and 27,653 women. 
Table 6: Incremental Linear Change in Social Fluidity for each channel 
   Men  Women 
   linear Effect  % explained  linear Effect  % explained 
Counterfactuals account for:         
1. Educational Expansion  ‐0.018  31.4%  0.023  ‐320.7% 
2. Compositional Effect  ‐0.032  55.3%  0.018  ‐241.2% 
3. Chang. Inequality in Education  ‐0.034  59.5%  ‐0.009  128.4% 
4. Chang. Returns to Education  ‐0.040  69.8%  ‐0.025  339.7% 
Observed Change in Fluidity (O)  ‐0.057  100.0%  ‐0.007  100.0% 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014); N = 47,809 men and 27,653 women. 
  
 
 
 
Appendix 
As outlined  in  the main part of  the  text,  the census occupational coding  (COC) scheme we  rely on 
here  differs  across  the  four  surveys  included  and  across  the  long  period  we  study.  The  most 
consequential change was the transition from COC1970 to COC1980, which  in fact prevented other 
researchers  from  creating  EGP  classes  for data  collected before  the 1980s  (Morgan & McKerrow, 
2004; Morgan & Kim, 2006; Morgan & Tang, 2007). To test for the effect of coding scheme changes 
on social fluidity, we exploit the fact that three consecutive GSS waves have been double‐coded into 
both 1970 and 1980 COC. We employ a series of loglinear models to test whether or not the coding 
differences between the COC1970s and COC1980s schemes may be responsible for changes in social 
fluidity across cohorts. Table A. 1 reports  fit statistics  for  the  following models: Models 1 accounts 
only for one‐ and two‐way associations between coding scheme (S), origin (O), destination (D), and 
cohort (C). Model 2 specifies uniform change of the OD association across cohorts. Model 3 fits the 
full three‐way interaction of origins, destinations and scheme. Model 4 fits the three‐way interaction 
with cohort instead of scheme. And Model 5 fits both three‐way interactions. 
Table A. 1: Comparison of Coding Schemes for COC1970s and COC1980s 
                p 
#  Parameters  G2  df  p  Δ  BIC  vs. #1  vs. #4 
M1  SO+SD+CO+CD  603.2  233  0.0000  0.168  ‐1,269     
M2  M1+OD u C  129.6  205  1.0000  0.066  ‐1,518  0.0000   
M3  M1+SOD  122.8  183  0.9998  0.064  ‐1,348  0.0000   
M4  M1+COD  50.4  133  1.0000  0.043  ‐1,018  0.0000   
M5  M4+SOD  41.0  108  1.0000  0.041  ‐1,348  0.0000  0.9982 
W1  SO+SD+CO+CD  517.0  233  0.0000  0.140  ‐1,399     
W2  W1+OD u C  198.6  205  0.6121  0.075  ‐1,487  0.0000   
W3  W1+SOD  195.3  183  0.2537  0.074  ‐1,310  0.0000   
W4  W1+COD  65.6  133  1.0000  0.038  ‐1,028  0.0000   
W5  W4+SOD  52.1  108  1.0000  0.034  ‐1,310  0.0000  0.9853 
Note: Authors' calculations. N = 3,089 coding instance for men and N= 3,727 coding instances for women. A 
reduced data set that randomly chooses one scheme for each observation yields the same substantial results 
but provides of course less power. Based on the three double‐coded GSS waves 1988‐1990. 
According to the deviance G2 and the DI (Δ), models M4 and W4 are they best fitting models. They 
account  for  cohort  change  (C)  but  no  additional  three‐way  association  between  origins  (O). 
destinations  (D),  and  coding  schemes  (S).  Additionally  allowing  for  the  coding  scheme  to  be 
associated with mobility patterns (M5 and W5) does not improve statistical fit; that is, accounting for 
the switch in coding schemes does not appreciably improve our understanding of mobility patterns. 
  
 
Table A. 2 Trends in (absolute) class gaps in education 
Men  High Service  Low Service  Non‐Manual  Self‐employed  Skilled Workers  Unskilled Workers 
max. HS  SC  BA+  max. HS  SC  BA+  max. HS  SC  BA+  max. HS  SC  BA+  max. HS  SC  BA+  max. HS  SC  BA+ 
1913‐1951 49.0  16.8  34.1  51.1  13.5  35.4  61.7  14.4  24.0  86.9  6.5  6.6  82.8  9.6  7.6  89.3  5.5  5.2 
1952‐1963 39.8  16.7  43.5  42.1  16.0  41.9  48.8  16.7  34.5  79.4  8.4  12.1  73.4  12.0  14.6  81.5  8.6  9.9 
1964‐1975 33.0  15.2  51.8  37.7  15.7  46.5  40.3  17.6  42.2  71.1  11.2  17.7  65.3  15.4  19.3  75.6  11.6  12.8 
1976‐1987 27.9  14.6  57.5  33.7  19.5  46.8  38.8  19.1  42.1  58.2  16.0  25.9  55.0  19.5  25.4  67.8  17.1  15.1 
1988‐1999 35.1  12.7  52.2  44.5  15.3  40.2  45.1  18.0  36.9  64.4  10.5  25.1  67.4  14.9  17.8  72.5  14.0  13.5 
2000‐2012 24.6  20.9  54.5  30.0  23.0  47.1  30.2  21.9  47.9  46.3  21.7  32.0  55.8  25.9  18.3  61.5  22.5  15.9 
Women  High Service  Low Service  Non‐Manual  Self‐employed  Skilled Workers  Unskilled Workers 
max. HS  SC  BA+  max. HS  SC  BA+  max. HS  SC  BA+  max. HS  SC  BA+  max. HS  SC  BA+  max. HS  SC  BA+ 
1913‐1951  75.6  3.4  21.0  69.2  5.1  25.6  81.0  2.4  16.7  91.9  1.4  6.7  96.7  1.2  2.1  95.6  0.4  4.0 
1952‐1963  56.4  11.2  32.5  55.8  17.9  26.3  67.0  13.5  19.5  82.5  8.0  9.4  82.2  10.2  7.5  88.8  6.6  4.5 
1964‐1975  42.5  18.3  39.2  49.5  18.8  31.7  54.9  15.3  29.8  72.7  11.2  16.2  73.9  14.2  11.9  80.1  11.2  8.8 
1976‐1987  29.7  17.7  52.7  42.9  19.8  37.3  44.3  21.9  33.9  57.0  15.5  27.5  62.0  17.1  20.9  71.5  15.3  13.2 
1988‐1999  31.4  14.3  54.4  38.4  17.6  44.0  47.0  20.7  32.3  55.4  15.2  29.4  58.8  21.2  20.0  64.7  21.1  14.2 
2000‐2012  21.5  17.3  61.2  30.0  19.8  50.2  30.1  22.6  47.4  42.7  19.6  37.8  45.1  28.2  26.8  51.4  29.3  19.4 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014). Max. HS includes high school graduates and dropouts, SC denotes some college, BA+ includes 
graduates and postgraduates. Percentages add up to 100 within each origin category. N = 47,809 men and N = 28,766 women. 
  
 
 
Table A. 3: Class attainment by obtained educational degree 
Men 
Max. HS   Some College  BA  Postgraduates 
Service 
class I+II 
Middle 
Classes 
Unskilled 
Workers 
Service 
class I+II 
Middle 
Classes 
Unskilled 
Workers 
Service 
class I+II 
Middle 
Classes 
Unskilled 
Workers 
Service 
class I+II 
Middle 
Classes 
Unskilled 
Workers 
1913‐1951  15.83  45.18  38.99  49.29  37.14  13.57  72.54  22.99  4.46  90.42  8.69  0.89 
1952‐1963  17.27  48.09  34.64  45.56  42.77  11.67  76.20  21.43  2.36  89.18  9.53  1.29 
1964‐1975  18.03  47.86  34.11  45.06  42.34  12.61  75.17  22.10  2.73  87.91  10.35  1.74 
1976‐1987  16.65  48.52  34.82  33.78  48.39  17.83  63.94  30.28  5.77  83.03  15.05  1.92 
1988‐1999  16.69  46.75  36.56  32.67  47.47  19.86  67.67  28.18  4.15  83.64  13.46  2.90 
2000‐2012  13.07  51.00  35.92  31.58  42.11  26.32  66.86  27.38  5.76  89.9  7.07  3.03 
Women 
Max. HS   Some College  BA  Postgraduates 
Service 
class I+II 
Middle 
Classes 
Unskilled 
Workers 
Service 
class I+II 
Middle 
Classes 
Unskilled 
Workers 
Service 
class I+II 
Middle 
Classes 
Unskilled 
Workers 
Service 
class I+II 
Middle 
Classes 
Unskilled 
Workers 
1913‐1951  11.98  33.66  54.36  47.06  35.29  17.65  74.60  20.63  4.76  100  0.00  0.00 
1952‐1963  14.10  37.31  48.58  34.32  49.55  16.14  68.34  24.45  7.21  84.62  14.53  0.85 
1964‐1975  17.22  40.82  41.96  38.82  46.64  14.54  66.76  26.48  6.76  83.82  14.31  1.87 
1976‐1987  19.52  40.32  40.16  41.29  41.56  17.14  63.70  27.56  8.74  85.07  12.28  2.65 
1988‐1999  21.10  32.89  46.02  34.93  41.89  23.17  67.39  25.63  6.98  82.68  13.20  4.11 
2000‐2012  20.29  28.55  51.15  35.53  36.93  27.54  60.95  29.29  9.76  81.69  15.49  2.82 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014). Middle Classes comprise routine non‐manuals, self‐employed, farmers and skilled workers. 
Service class comprises low and high positions in the salariat. Percentages add up to 100 within each educational degree. N = 47,809 men and N = 28,766 women. 
 
  
 
Table A. 4: Fit Statistics of Loglinear Models fitted to Counterfactual Tables ‐ Men 
            p 
  G2  df  p  Δ  BIC  vs. #.1  vs. #.2 
No Change 
1.1 Constant  0.5  125  1.0000  0.001  ‐1,346     
1.2 Linear UniDiFF  0.3  124  1.0000  0.001  ‐1,336  0.6547   
1.3 UniDiFF  0.3  120  1.0000  0.001  ‐1,293  0.9991  1.0000 
Educational Expansion 
2.1 Constant  10.2  125  1.0000  0.005  ‐1,337     
2.2 Linear UniDiFF  5.5  124  1.0000  0.004  ‐1,331  0.0302   
2.3 UniDiFF  4.9  120  1.0000  0.004  ‐1,288  0.3804  0.9631 
Compos. Effect 
3.1 Constant  25.7  125  1.0000  0.008  ‐1,321     
3.2 Linear UniDiFF  15.1  124  1.0000  0.006  ‐1,321  0.0011   
3.3 UniDiFF  14.0  120  1.0000  0.006  ‐1,279  0.0391  0.8943 
Chang. Inequality in Education 
4.1 Constant  63.7  125  1.0000  0.012  ‐1,283     
4.2 Linear UniDiFF  51.3  124  1.0000  0.011  ‐1,285  0.0004   
4.3 UniDiFF  50.5  120  1.0000  0.011  ‐1,243  0.0216  0.9385 
Chang. Returns to Education 
5.1 Constant  87.1  125  0.9960  0.014  ‐1,260     
5.2 Linear UniDiFF  68.3  124  1.0000  0.013  ‐1,268  0.0000   
5.3 UniDiFF  66.2  120  1.0000  0.012  ‐1,227  0.0009  0.7174 
Observed 
6.1 Constant  248.1  125  0.0000  0.022  ‐1,099     
6.2 Linear UniDiFF  203.2  124  0.0000  0.021  ‐1,133  0.0000   
6.3 UniDiFF  198.0  120  0.0000  0.021  ‐1,095  0.0000  0.2674 
UniDiff Parameters  Linear  C = 1  C = 2  C = 3  C = 4  C = 5  C = 6 
1.2 & 1.3  0.0037  1  1.0054  1.0091  1.0155  1.0105  1.0198 
2.2 & 2.3  ‐0.0179  1  1.0015  0.9822  0.9496  0.9306  0.9247 
3.2 & 3.3  ‐0.0316  1  0.9984  0.9612  0.9009  0.8804  0.8667 
4.2 & 4.3  ‐0.0340  1  0.9574  0.9406  0.8809  0.8420  0.8574 
5.2 & 5.3  ‐0.0399  1  0.9613  0.9347  0.8472  0.8286  0.8476 
6.2 & 6.3  ‐0.0571  1  0.8977  0.8319  0.7596  0.7618  0.7396 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014); N = 47,809 men. 
  
 
Table A. 5: Fit Statistics of Loglinear Models fitted to Counterfactual Tables ‐ Women 
            p 
  G2  df  p  Δ  BIC  vs. #.1  vs. #.2 
No Change 
1.1 Constant  0.8  125  1.0000  0.001  ‐1,283     
1.2 Linear UniDiFF  0.7  124  1.0000  0.001  ‐1,272  0.7518   
1.3 UniDiFF  0.7  120  1.0000  0.001  ‐1,231  0.9998  1.0000 
Educational Expansion 
2.1 Constant  3.3  125  1.0000  0.003  ‐1,280     
2.2 Linear UniDiFF  1.6  124  1.0000  0.002  ‐1,272  0.1923   
2.3 UniDiFF  0.9  120  1.0000  0.002  ‐1,231  0.7915  0.9513 
Compos. Effect 
3.1 Constant  5.2  125  1.0000  0.004  ‐1,278     
3.2 Linear UniDiFF  4.6  124  1.0000  0.004  ‐1,269  0.4386   
3.3 UniDiFF  4.0  120  1.0000  0.004  ‐1,228  0.9449  0.9631 
Chang. Inequality in Education 
4.1 Constant  15.9  125  1.0000  0.008  ‐1,268     
4.2 Linear UniDiFF  15.7  124  1.0000  0.008  ‐1,257  0.6547   
4.3 UniDiFF  15.2  120  1.0000  0.008  ‐1,217  0.9830  0.9735 
Chang. Returns to Education 
5.1 Constant  35.4  125  1.0000  0.012  ‐1,248     
5.2 Linear UniDiFF  33.6  124  1.0000  0.012  ‐1,240  0.1797   
5.3 UniDiFF  33.3  120  1.0000  0.012  ‐1,199  0.8351  0.9898 
Observed 
6.1 Constant  201.5  125  0.0000  0.028  ‐1,082     
6.2 Linear UniDiFF  201.4  124  0.0000  0.028  ‐1,072  0.7518   
6.3 UniDiFF  200.6  120  0.0000  0.028  ‐1,031  0.9702  0.9385 
UniDiff Parameters  Linear  C = 1  C = 2  C = 3  C = 4  C = 5  C = 6 
1.2 & 1.3  ‐0.0057  1  0.9937  0.9938  0.9845  0.9779  0.9730 
2.2 & 2.3  0.0234  1  1.0383  1.0833  1.1209  1.1066  1.1203 
3.2 & 3.3  0.0176  1  1.0474  1.0906  1.1262  1.0974  1.1009 
4.2 & 4.3  ‐0.0094  1  1.0561  1.0475  1.0505  0.9984  1.0094 
5.2 & 5.3  ‐0.0248  1  1.0322  1.0166  0.9785  0.9345  0.9278 
6.2 & 6.3  ‐0.0073  1  0.9079  0.8811  0.8829  0.8926  0.8997 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014); N = 28,766 women. 
 
  
 
Figure A. 1: Differences in the two‐way interaction across survey and survey years for men 
 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014); N = 47,809 men. Dashed lines mark UniDiff 
parameters based on other data sets than the GSS. 
  
 
Figure A. 2: Differences in the two‐way interaction across survey and survey years for women 
 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014); N = 27,653 women. Dashed lines mark UniDiff 
parameters based on other data sets than the GSS.
  
 
 
Table A. 6: Fit statistics for Surveys year change in the two‐way associations 
                     p 
      G^2  df  p  DI  BIC  vs. #.1  vs. #.2 
M
en
 
ODSY ‐ Men (Trends in Social Mobility)                
1.1 Constant  1116.3  925  0.0000  0.043  ‐8,851     
1.2 Linear UniDiFF  1068.1  924  0.0007  0.039  ‐8,888  0.0000   
1.3 UniDiFF  1000.4  888  0.0050  0.038  ‐8,568  0.0000  0.0011 
OESY ‐ Men (Trends in Social Mobility)        
2.1 Constant  893.7  740  0.0001  0.037  ‐7,080     
2.2 Linear UniDiFF  893.5  739  0.0001  0.037  ‐7,069  0.6547   
2.3 UniDiFF  844.7  703  0.0002  0.035  ‐6,730  0.0896  0.0755 
EDSY ‐ Men (Trends in Social Mobility)        
3.1 Constant  960.2  740  0.0000  0.034  ‐7,013     
3.2 Linear UniDiFF  950.2  739  0.0000  0.033  ‐7,013  0.0016   
3.3 UniDiFF  904.5  703  0.0000  0.032  ‐6,670  0.0248  0.1290 
W
om
en
 
ODSY ‐ Women (Trends in Social Mobility)       
1.1 Constant  1004.9  900  0.0082  0.057  ‐8,235     
1.2 Linear UniDiFF  1004.7  899  0.0078  0.057  ‐8,225  0.6547   
1.3 UniDiFF  943.4  864  0.0306  0.054  ‐7,927  0.0051  0.0039 
OESY ‐ Women (Trends in Social Mobility)       
2.1 Constant  577.8  540 0.1259 0.038 ‐4,966     
2.2 Linear UniDiFF  573.2  539  0.1490  0.038  ‐4,961  0.0320   
2.3 UniDiFF  515.4  504  0.3532  0.033  ‐4,659  0.0041  0.0090 
EDSY ‐ Women (Trends in Social Mobility)       
3.1 Constant  758.3  540  0.00000  0.043  ‐4785.9     
3.2 Linear UniDiFF  700.5  539 0.00000 0.04 ‐4833.4  0.0000 
3.3 UniDiFF  651.5  504  0.00001  0.038  ‐4523  0.0000  0.0584 
  UniDiff Parameters  Linear             
M
en
  OD (1.2 & 1.3)  ‐0.007         
OE (2.2 & 2.3)  0.001         
ED (3.2 & 3.3)  ‐0.003                   
W
om
en
 
OD (1.2 & 1.3)  ‐0.001                   
OE (2.2 & 2.3)  ‐0.004         
ED (3.2 & 3.3)  ‐0.009                   
Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014); N = 47,809 men and N = 28,766 women. 
UniDiff parameters plotted in Figure A. 1 and Figure A. 2. 
  
 
 
Figure A. 3: Compositional effect, Trends and Simulation based solely on completed observations 
 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on composite dataset (1972–2014) excluding observations with missing data on 
origins, destinations or education; N = 34,555 men and N = 17,675 women. 
  
 
 
